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that the identity statement expressed by (4) is necessarily false or is not warran-
tedly assertable. 
I am sympathetic to the view that we do not know very much about which 
are the essential human properties. I am even inclined to agree with Morris when 
he suggests (pp. 135-36) that it is methodologically permissible, and perhaps 
even obligatory, for Christian philosophers to use what faith teaches about the 
Incarnation as a control on their theorizing about human nature. But I do not 
believe that our knowledge of essential human properties is quite so meager as 
it would have to be in order to render the position Morris defends unproblematic, 
and so I think Leibniz's Law still spells trouble for the statement expressed by 
(4). It seems to me that we do know, on the basis of broadly scientific consid-
erations, that being an organism is a property essential to each human. And it 
also seems to me that we know that God, being by nature Pure Spirit, has 
essentially the property of being a non-organism. Of course I could be wrong 
about one or both of these things. And I do not mean to assert that each human 
is exactly the same sort of organism whenever he or she exists; our present 
bodies may differ in biological detail from our glorified bodies after the General 
Resurrection. But I think I have the appearances with me in suggesting that the 
little we do know about human nature suffices to show that the two referring 
expressions in (4) do not pass the test for co-referentiality posed by the formulation 
of Leibniz's Law Morris has endorsed. 
Though I found much to disagree with in Understanding Identity Statements, 
my criticisms are meant as a compliment to the book's power to provoke philo-
sophical thought. It deals with important philosophical problems in a novel and 
stimulating way. It is written in a style which is clear, concise, and refreshingly 
free of superfluous technicalities. And it sets forth a theoretical position which 
merits careful consideration by all Christian philosophers. 
Being Human ... Becoming Human, by Helmut Thielicke. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 475 pages. $17.95. 
Reviewed by T. WILLIAM HALL. 
Upon reading Helmut Thielicke's Being Human ... Becoming Human one is 
quickly reminded of Paul Tillich's The Courage fa Be, Ernest Becker's The 
Denial of Death, and Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in that all focus 
on the limits and possibilities of being human. They are similar, too, in that all 
draw upon depth psychologies, on philosophical insights, on literary images, 
and all deal with moral issues. Thielicke's book stands apart from the others in 
the explicit and constant use of classical Christian theology as his criterion of 
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adequacy. 
At the beginning, this book is deceptive. The "who am IT' question, prominent 
since the existentialist era, and given pablum nourishment in the hedonistic age 
of the 1960's, is raised as if it were being discussed for the first time. It soon 
becomes clear, however, that the issue of identity is not a mere emotive cry of 
an adolescent adult but a probing into metaphysical roots of the self and into 
problems of epistemology and moral philosophy. 
Thielicke, as ifto clear away the debris of secular anthropologies, is convincing 
in his argument that there is no adequate objective (i.e. scientific) way to study 
the human. Even adding up all empirical aspects will not lead to an explanation 
of the human, he says. "People cannot be explained but only understood." (17) 
In so far as scientists can know humanity, they must do so "as an object of 
faith ... thus to use a theological category." (385) 
As a Christian anthropologist, the author seeks to analyze contemporary human 
problems such as identity, guilt, and freedom, finding modem sociological, 
psychological and anthropological theories helpful, if inadequate. They are 
inadequate primarily because they are unable to deal with the reality of transcen-
dence-both self transcendence and a transcendent Other. (200) 
Throughout the major portion of the book, the author examines issues related 
to becoming human such as autonomy and authority, the self and society, 
humanity and technology, sexuality, time, death and eternal life. These several 
hundred pages, however, do not provide a sustained argument for any theory of 
either being or becoming human. Rather these pages are a series of loosely 
connected essays which may be useful as a resource for any reader searching 
for a thorough discussion of problems related to an understanding of the human. 
While Thielicke presents no definitive solution to the problem presented by 
the title of the book, Teilhard de Chardin appears to suggest to the author the 
most satisfactory clue. In Teilhard's view, there is a self transcendent dimension 
within the human as well as the transcendent reality of God. With Teilhard, 
Thielicke can return to the sciences, but this return is to the kind of science "that 
does not stop at objectifiable details but thinks symbolically, and thus gives 
objects their meaning." (450) Thus the author resonates with Teilhard for whom 
"a cosmic sense and a Christian sense are not two different things." (452) 
While Becker calls for an admission of the truth of the myth of the fall and 
the failure of any causa sui project, and Tillich sees human possibility through 
courage, and Kierkegaard presents the knight of faith as a model for a Christian 
person, this book provides no conclusive theories about the human. Thielicke's 
work, as lengthy as it is, seems but a prologomena to some future Christian 
view of the human, using 475 pages to explore dozens of topics and the thought 
of nearly every major philosopher and theologian in the West as if dialogue 
might mysteriously reveal some truth about being and becoming human. But if 
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dialogue is his metaphor for authentic humanity, as argued by H. R. Niebuhr 
in The Responsible Self, then some defense of dialogue is called for. 
While over all conclusions are few, the volume is chuck full of insights, 
primarily insights drawn from Christian theology. For example, in writing about 
history and meaning, he insists upon the need for transcendence to observe 
meaning. And "this presence of transcendence in history is Jesus Christ." (315) 
In so far as Christ is present at the center, "it is a higher center of perspective 
from which one can see both forward and backward." (316) This potential vision 
of past and future made possible by the transcendent Christ is strikingly similar 
to Richard Niebuhr's view of revelation in The Meaning of Revelation. 
In writing about freedom and tradition, he suggests that either alone may be 
destructive. They may, however, exist in creative tension. In defending the latter 
he writes: "Freedom can conjure up total un freedom by way of unrestricted 
misuse .. .It is of the very nature of human personhood and freedom that there 
can be no gift (Gabe) which is not also a task (Aufgabe), and only thus a gift." 
(243-4). 
In his discussion of humanity and technology, the author points to persons 
who are both initiator and possible victim of the technological processes. The 
problem is thus not technology, but it is that of the human genius who has 
produced its powers for good and evil. With regard to the bomb, we have become 
a danger to ourselves. "Without God-which means without the final commitment 
that we have called the premise of trust and the basic condition of communica-
tion---everything is permissible". (Dostoevski) (298-9) 
There are insights, too, in his discussion of human sexuality. The fact that 
humans are not determined in their sexual lives by instinct alone, and that there 
is a natural propensity toward sexual activity carries an impulse toward humani-
zation. "To take up a phrase of Sartre's, and to modify its original thrust, we 
might say, with tongue in check, that we are 'condemned to freedom'." (199) 
He goes on to say that the transition from natural constraint to conscious and 
accountable actions is both a possibility and a necessity. And it is this self 
transcendence which is, according to Thielicke, a potentiality present in the 
structure of the human. 
Through these and other vignettes which might be reported, a common theme 
runs through the book: the sciences are not equipped to deal with transcendence. 
Only from a Christian view of humanity which understands transcendence as an 
essential dimension of and beyond the human can we have an adequate anthropol-
ogy. 
